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The Church Abuse Scandal: Prosecuting The Pope
Before The International Criminal Court
Benjamin David Landry*

Abstract
In the early 2000s, the Catholic Church was revealed to have been involved in a pattern
of sexual abuse of children. The Church's internalpolicies allowed members to cover up the
abuse by swearing victims to secrey and refusing to report the abuse to authorities.This routine
arguably enabledfurther abuse by providing abusers with continued access to children. Due, in
part, to the hierarchicalstructure of the Church, commentators arguedfor the prosecution of
Church leadership. Commentatorsfocused on CardinalJoseph Ratinger, now Pope Benedict
XT7, who was, from 1971 to his elevation to the Holy See in 2005, the individual in the
Catholic Church directly responsiblefor handling accusationsof sexual abuse. In April 2010,
United Nations Judge Geoffrey Robinson suggested that the Pope be prosecuted before the
InternationalCriminalCourtfor "crimes against humanity"for his role in the scandal This
Comment analyzges the viability of a potentialprosecution,considering not only the substantive
legal grounds of such a prosecution, but defenses, jurisdictional obstacles, and meaningful
outcomes for victims as well While this Comment concludes that, legally, a prosecutor could
make a compelling andpotenialy successful case, there are politicalandpracticalobstacles to
obtainingjurisdictionover the Pope that will likely preclude a casefrom ever moving forward.

*

BA 2009, Albion College; JD Candidate 2012, The University of Chicago Law School. The author
would like to thank the CJIL staff, particularly Anthony Sexton for his life-long commitment to
legal scholarship. The author acknowledges that all remaining errors are his own.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the years immediately following the turn of the century, evidence began
to emerge of endemic sexual abuse by Catholic priests of children in their care.'
When Church leaders became aware of the abuse, their policy was to swear the
victims to secrecy and temporarily suspend or transfer accused priests to new
parishes without notifying authorities. Many commentators, including members
of the Catholic clergy, argue that this pattern of concealing abuse from civil
authorities and allowing offenders to remain members of the clergy enabled
See generally Thomas G. Plante, ed, Sin against the Innocents: SexualAbuse by Priests and the Rule of the
Catholic Church (Praeger 2004); The Investigative Staff of The Boston Globe, Betryal: The Crisis in
the Catholic Church (Lttle Brown 2003).
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more abuse.2 This policy was disseminated and enforced by Cardinal Joseph
Ratzinger, whom, since 2005, we know as Pope Benedict XVI. From 1981 to his
elevation to the Holy See, Cardinal Ratzinger was the leader of the Congregation
for the Doctrine of Faith (CDF), in which capacity he was responsible for
addressing accusations of sexual abuse by Catholic priests worldwide.'
On May 18, 2001 (the eve of the sexual abuse going public), Cardinal
Ratzinger sent a letter to all bishops citing a then-secret 1962 Church document
outlining the Church's policy on the sexual abuse of minors, the Cimen
Sollicitaionis.4 The Crimen So/liCitaionisrequired the internalization of sexual abuse
claims and demanded strict secrecy regarding the proceedings of the Church's
ecclesiastical court, although it did not directly mandate secrecy regarding the
underlying events.' Its procedure involved swearing victims to an oath of
secrecy.6 It required that "matters be pursued in a most secretive way," that
information regarding cases "be restrained by a perpetual silence," and that
"each and everyone pertaining to the [internal] tribunal in any way or admitted
to knowledge of the matters because of their office, . . . observe the strictest
secret . . . under penalty of excommunication"'7 among other ecclesiastic

punishments.'
2

See, for example, Plante, Sin Against the Innocents (cited in note 1); Joan Chittister, Divided loyalies:
an incredible situation, National Catholic
Reporter (Mar
17, 2010),
online
at
http://ncronline.org/blogs/where-i-stand/divided-loyalties-incredible-situation
(visited Apr 8,
2011).

3

Marcellino D'Ambrosio, Joseph Cardinal Ratinger, the future Pope Benedict XVI: Biography and Select
Writings,
(The
Crossroads
Initiative,
online
at
http://www.crossroadsinitiative.com/1ibraryauthor/114/CardinalRatzinger.html (visited Apr 8,
2011).

4.

See
generally
Crimen
Sollidtationis, (The
Vatican
Press,
1962),
online
at
http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Observer/documents/2003/08/16/Criminales.pdf (visited
Apr 8, 2011); Hans Kiing, Ratinger's Responsibilty (National Catholic Reporter, Mar 18, 2010),
online at http://ncronline.org/news/accountability/ratzingers-responsibility
(visited Apr 8,
2011); Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Congregationfor the Doctrine of FaithLetter Regarding the More Serious
Offenses (May 18, 2001), online at http://www.bishop-accountability.org/resources/resourcefiles/churchdocs/EpistulaEnglish.htm (visited Apr 8, 2011).

5

John L. Allen, Jr, 1962 document orderssecrecy in sex cases; Many bishops unaware obscure missive was in their
archives,
(National
Catholic
Reporter,
Aug
7,
2003),
online
at
http://www.nationalcatholicreporter.org/update/bn080703.htm (visited Apr 8, 2011) ("[Canon
lawyers] say[| secrecy in canonical procedures should not be confused with refusal to cooperate
with civil authorities. The 1962 document would not have tied the hands of a bishop, or anyone
else, who wanted to report a crime by a priest to the police.").
Crimen Solitationis 11 and Appendix 27 Formula A (cited in note 4); Anthony Barnett, Vatican

6

told bishops to cover up sex abuse, (The Guardian, Aug 17, 2003), online at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/aug/17/religion.childprotection (visited Apr 8, 2011).

7
8

Crimen Soldtationis T 11 (cited in note 4).
Id
13 and 70.
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In his 2001 letter, Cardinal Ratzinger cited and referenced the Crimen
Sollidtauionis in summarizing the Church's policy. The letter also introduced
several new norms, particularly, that his office (the CDF) would have exclusive
competence regarding allegations of the sexual abuse of minors, which meant
that Ratzinger was in complete control of the Church's response to the abuse.9
The Crimen Sollidtationis policy was enforced by Cardinal Ratzinger throughout
his time as leader of the CDF, and now in his capacity as the Pope.'0
The Pope's actions have prompted some commentators to argue that his
role in the pattern of covering up and enabling the sexual abuse amounts to
"crimes against humanity," one of the crimes prosecutable in the International
Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC was created by the United Nations in 1998 and
entered into force July 1st, 2002.11 "The ICC is the first permanent and universal
international criminal court."1 2 It prosecutes individuals for a limited number of
crimes set out in its Statute.' In its history, the ICC has initiated an extremely
small number of proceedings, due in large part to the number of important
states who are not parties-notables on the list include China, Iran, Japan,
Pakistan, Russia, and the US.' 4 As of April 2011, the Court has only opened
investigations into six situations: Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Darfur, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Kenya, and Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya (regarding Muammar al Gaddafi).'"
This Comment will provide a legal analysis of the viability of prosecuting
the Pope in the ICC for crimes against humanity for his conscious disregard of
9

CNS and Staff, Doctrinal Congregation Takes Over Priest# Pedophika Cases, (America: The National
online
at
2001),
17,
Weekly,
Dec
Catholic
http://americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?articleid=1352&s=1 (visited Apr 8, 2011).

to

Allen, 1962 document orders secreg in sex cases (cited in note 5); Jamie Doward, Pope 'obstructed' sex
at
online
2005),
24,
Apr
Guardian,
(The
abuse
inquit,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/apr/24/children.childprotection (visited Apr 8, 2011).

11

Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law 277 (Cambridge 2005), citing 2187 UNTS 91 (No.
38544).

12

Id.

13

Rome Statute of the International

14

Id.
Situations

15

Criminal Court, United Nations, Art 7(l), UN Doc
A/CONF.183/9* (July 17, 1998), online at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm
(visited Apr 8, 2011) ("Rome Statute").
and Cases, (International
Criminal
Court),
online
at
http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/ (visited Apr 8, 2011); Statement of the Prosecutoron the
opening of an investigation into the situation in Libya, International Criminal Court, (Mar 3, 2011), online
http://www.iccat
cpi.int/menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%2%Oo/2Othe/o20prosecutor/reports
%20and%20statements/statemedt/statemen/o20f%/o20the%20prosecutoro/o20on%20the%20op
ening/o20oP/o20the%20investigation%20into%20the%20situation%20in%20ihbya?Ian=en-GB
(visited Apr 8, 2011).
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the sexual abuse of children by Catholic priests under the power of the Catholic
Church. It will proceed in four Sections, analyzing first whether the Pope has
committed crimes against humanity pursuant to the ICC definition; second,
whether the Pope has any viable defenses; third, how the ICC could obtain
jurisdiction over the Pope and any issues it may have in doing so; and, fourth,
what the possible outcomes of such a prosecution could be.
It is important to establish from the start that this Comment does not
suggest that the Pope should be prosecuted, or argue one way or the other; rather,
the intent is to analyze, objectively, in light of the ICC Statute and the known
evidence, whether the Pope could be prosecuted. I shall leave arguments of
morality and philosophy to those better suited.
II. CULPABILITY
The ICC Statute defines crimes against humanity as one of eleven acts
"committed as a part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack."" The first element deals
directly with the Pope's actions (and therefore requires evidence of the Pope's
conduct in relation to the abuse), while the second, third and fourth deal with
the nature of the abuse itself (and therefore require evidence of the abuse by
Catholic priests worldwide).
A. The Act
Article 7 of the Statute enumerates eleven acts, any one of which may
qualify for a finding of crimes against humanity. 7 The seventh listed act is
"[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity."'" The
sexual abuse of children by Catholic priests will almost certainly qualify under
rape and will likely come under the umbrella of the catchall "any other form of
sexual violence of comparable gravity."'
There is no evidence to suggest that the Pope ever personally abused a
child. That being the case, the question then becomes, as a non-actor, is the
Pope liable? Individual criminal responsibility is defined in Article 25 and the
responsibility of commanders and other superiors in Article 28.

16

Rome Statute at Art 7(1).

17

Id.

18

Id at Art 7(l)(g).

19

However, the phrase "any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity" has not yet been
defined by the Court.
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1. Article 25.
Article 25(2) states that "[a] person who commits a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually responsible and liable for
punishment in accordance with this Statute." 20 Section 25(3) enumerates four
specific circumstances under which a person will be individually criminally liable:
if that person: (a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly
with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other
person is criminally responsible; (b) Orders, solicits, or induces the
commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted; (c) For the
purposes of facilitating the commission of a crime, aids, abets or otherwise
assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing
the means for its commission; (d) In any other way contributes to the
commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of
persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be
intentional and shall either: (i) Be made with the aim of furthering the
criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or
purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to
commit the crime. 21
I will analyze the Pope's potential culpability with respect to each.
a) Co-perpetrator.Subsection (a) establishes liability as a co-perpetrator. One
will be liable if he or she "[c]ommits [one of the enumerated acts], whether as an
individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether
that other person is criminally responsible."2 2 Here, because the Pope did not
personally abuse any child, either by himself or jointly with another, he will not
be liable as a co-perpetrator.
b) Orders, solicits or induces. Subsection (b) establishes liability for an
individual who "[o]rders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime
which in fact occurs or is attempted." The strongest argument under this
subsection is that the Pope "induc[ed]" the abuse. Certainly, the Pope did not
"order" the abuse, as there is no evidence of purposeful intent. It would be
equally unsubstantiated to suggest that he "solicited" the abuse. However, it is
arguable that the Church's policy induced the abuse insofar as it enabled its
continuation. The question then becomes what mental state is required to
establish "induced"?
Article 30 of the ICC Statute provides the definitions of intent and
knowledge and serves as the default rule for all crimes within the jurisdiction of

21

Rome Statute at Art 7(2).
Id at Art 25(3) (cited in note 13).

22

Id.

20
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the Court unless otherwise provided. 23 "Consequently, it must be established
that the material elements of the respective crime were committed with 'intent
and knowledge,' unless the Statute or the Elements of Crimes require a different
standard of fault." 24 Article 30(2) states that "a person has intent where: (a) In
relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; [or] (b) In
relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is
aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events." 25 Article 30(3) states
that "[fjor the purposes of this article, 'knowledge' means an awareness that a
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of
events." 26 The ICC has explained that, "[w]ith respect to . . . recklessness or any
lower form of culpability, the Chamber is of the view that such concepts are not
captured by article 30 of the Statute."2 7 This means that in order to have
knowledge, or intent with respect to the consequence, the Pope needed to have
been virtually certain or practically certain "that the consequence will follow,
barring an unforeseen or unexpected intervention that prevent[s] [sic] its
occurrence." 28
On the known evidence, it is arguable that the Pope knew providing
abusive priests continued access to children would, in the ordinary course of
events, result in further abuse.29 In this way, an argument could be made that the
Pope had Article 30(2)(b) intent and Article 30(3) knowledge. This argument, as
stated above, depends upon a showing that the Pope was "aware U that [abuse
would] occur in the ordinary course of events"30 if he kept incidents of abuse
secret and allowed priests to continue working with children. This will not be an
easy showing.
The Pope could argue that he truly believed the internal policies of the
Cimen Sollicitationis would end the abuse-in fact, in his 2001 letter, Cardinal
Ratzinger concludes by saying "[t]hrough this letter . . . it is hoped [ that more

23
24

25

Id at Art 30.
Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No ICC 01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo, 1 136 (June 15, 2009), online at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc699541.pdf
(visited Apr 8, 2011) ("Bemba Confirmation Decision").
Rome Statute at Art 30(2).

27

Id at Art 30(3).
Bemba Confirmation Decision,

28

Id

26

29

30

360 (cited in note 24).

362.
See Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse Investigation Committee Report, vol 1 5 7.845 T 3
(May 20, 2009), online at http://www.childabusecommission.ie/rpt/pdfs (visited Apr 8, 2011)
("Ryan Report").
Rome Statute at Art 30(3).
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grave delicts will be entirely avoided." 3' This defense, however, is particularly
weak given the Church's recent, and numerous, acknowledgments that it
mishandled the scandal, and the mounting evidence of the attempts to cover up
the abuse (particularly in Ireland).3 2
In addition to the burden of making this showing, a potential prosecutor
may be faced with the possibility that the term "induces" could be construed to
imply a further positive step of either persuading or affirmatively influencing
someone to act or to bring about the conduct, which the Pope is certainly not
guilty of doing.33 On balance, subsection (b) liability for "orders, solicits or
induces" is unlikely to be the avenue a potential prosecutor pursues given the
alternative avenue under Article 28, discussed in Section A.2, and the potential
additional step required by "induces." 34
c) Derivative or accessorial liability. Subsection (c) establishes "a mode of
derivative or accessorial liability."" A person will be criminally liable if that
person, "[flor the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids,
abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission,
including providing the means for its commission." Here, the Pope's conduct
certainly assisted in the commission of the crime insofar as his failure to report
abuse, hold abusers accountable, and keep abusers from interacting with
children allegedly enabled more abuse to occur." But his actions were not made
"[fjor the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime." This will
likely preclude culpability under this section.
d) Group crimes. Subsection (d) establishes accessorial liability for "group
crimes."37 It states that a person will be criminally liable if that person:
[i]n any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission
of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such
contribution shall be intentional and shall either: (i) Be made with the aim of
furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such
activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the

31
32

Ratzinger, Congregationfor the Doctine of Faith Letter (cited in note 4).
Stacy Meichtry, Pope Convenes Cardinals On Response to Sex Abuse, Wall St J A12 (Nov 9, 2010);
Frances D'Emilio, Wikileaks: Vatican PressuredIreland On Sex Abuse Scandal, (Associated Press, Dec
2010),
online
at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/11 /wikileaks-vatican11,
Apr 8, 2011).
(visited
pressurn_795334.html#

33

"Induces" has not yet been defined by the Court, and as such, this argument is purely
anticipatory.

34

Rome Statute at Art 25(b)(3).

35

Christoph Burchard, Anillat and Neutral Business Contributions to 'Corporate-PoliticalCore Crime'
InitialEnquiries Concerningthe Rome Statute, 8 J Intl Crim Just 919, 937 (2010).
Proof of the nexus between the Pope's conduct and the crimes is dealt with in Sections II.B-D.

36

7

Burchard, 8 J Intl Crim Just at 943 (cited in note 35).
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jurisdiction of the Court; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention
of the group to commit the crime.38
Here, the alleged actor need only "contribute" to the crime, a broad term
that may "encompass[] the facilitation of merely contextual and general
conditions that ultimately feed into the commission of a crime by a group,"
rather than taken to assist a particular crime. 39 Romanettes (i) and (ii) establish an
additional mental element-that the alleged accessory's intentional "contribution
... (i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity ... or (ii) Be
made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime."
Again, because the Pope did not act "with the aim of furthering the criminal
activity," he will not be liable under (i). Proving that the act was "made in the
knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime" will require a
showing that (1) Cardinal Ratzinger knew that his. actions would cause more
abuse and that (2) the Catholic Church as a group intended to abuse children.
The fact that the Catholic Church, as a group, did not intend to universally abuse
children will almost certainly bar liability under this subsection.
2. Article 28.
Article 28 allows for a respondeat superior type of criminal liability. The
general idea is:
a person who has neither the subjective element of a crime (mens rea), nor
participates in the objective element (actus reus), but is a superior of a
perpetrator may be criminally responsible if he knew his subordinate was
about to commit a crime and failed to take necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent it or, having reason to know that a crime was
committed, failed to investigate or punish his subordinate. 0
This is the most likely avenue a potential persecutor would take in
prosecuting the Pope as it is the one most clearly satisfied. Article 28 states:
a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction
of the Court committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority
and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over
such subordinates, where: (i) The superior knew, or consciously disregarded
information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing
or about to commit such crimes; (ii) The crimes concerned activities that
were within the effective responsibility and control of the superior; and (iii)
The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his

38

Rome Statute at Art 25(3)(d).

39

Burchard, 8 J Intl Crim Just at 942 (cited in note 35).

40

Dermot Groome, The Church Abuse Scandal Were Crimes Against Humanity Committed?, 11 Chi J Intl
L 439, 470 (2011).
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or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the
matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. 41
I will address each element in turn.
a) Knew or consdousy disregarded. With respect to (i), the Pope clearly knew
about the endemic abuse, evidenced directly by his 2001 letter in response to the
rising number of sexual abuse cases.42 Additionally, in its 2005 Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges in Prosecutor v jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Bemba
Confirmation Decision) the ICC stated that "[a]ctual knowledge may be also
proven if, 'a priori, [a military commander] is part of an organised structure with
established reporting and monitoring systems."' 43 Although the Pope is not a
military commander, his role as the leader of the CDF, set forth in the Crimen
Sollicitationis and his 2001 letter, involves obtaining direct reports of abuse and
then monitoring and responding to them. In this way, his role is similar to that
of a military commander as described by the Court above.
Additionally, it is arguable that the Pope consciously disregarded
information (reports of abuse he received in his capacity as leader of the CDF)
that clearly indicated subordinates were about to, or would continue to, commit
such acts." This conclusion is supported by evidence of the Church
acknowledging its errors,4 5 although this theory will require a showing that the
Pope was virtually or practically certain that further abuse would occur. The
operative evidence, however, is the Pope's direct knowledge of the abuse, which
will satisfy the "knew or consciously disregarded"" language.

42

Rome Statute at Art 28.
Ratzinger, Congregationfor the Doctrine of the FaithLetter (cited in note 4).

43

Bemba Confirmation Decision,

4

See David Gibson, What Did the Pope Know, and When Did He Know It?, (Politics Daily, Mar 25,
2010), online at http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/03/25/what-did-the-pope-know-and-whendid-he-know-it/ (visited Apr 8, 2011):

41

1431

(cited in note 24).

The most problematic case thus far for Benedict concerned his 1977-1982
tenure as archbishop of Munich, when he accepted a priest, Father Peter
Hullermann, into the diocese for psychological evaluation and treatment after
Hullerman had sexually abused a number of children. The priest was soon
reassigned to a parish, where he went on to abuse more children for years,
even after Ratzinger left to become a top doctrinal official at the Vatican.
See also Meichtry, Pope Convenes CardinalsOn Response to Sex Abuse, Wall St J at A12 (cited in note
32); D'Emilio, Wikileaks: Vatican PressuredIreland On Sex Abuse Scandal (cited in note 32).
45

Meichtry, Pope Convenes CardinalsOn Response to Sex Abuse, Wall St J at Al 2 (cited in note 32) ("In
an address to bishops, . . . Cardinal Angelo Bagnasco, the head of the Italian bishops conference,
zeroed in on the crisis, saying the church had betrayed its flock by making sins of omission in
handling sexual-abuses cases.") (internal citations omitted).

4

Rome Statute at Art 28(b)(1).
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b) Reiponsibility and control. As the leader of CDF, then-Cardinal Ratzinger
was responsible for addressing accusations of sexual abuse by priests worldwide.
Quoting canonical law, Ratzinger writes, in his 2001 letter:
[The Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith] examines delicts against faith
and more grave delicts both against morals and committed in the
celebration of the sacraments which have been reported to it and, if
necessary, proceeds to declare or impose canonical sanctions according to
the norm of common or proper law.47
The 2001 letter also gives the CDF exclusive competence to handle cases
of sexual abuse, which means "the crimes and activities" were well "within" his
"responsibility and control"-indeed, they were his direct responsibility."
c) Measures to prevent, repress, or report. The ICC clarified subsection (iii) of
Article 28(b) in its Bemba Confirmation Decision. That case dealt with Article
28(a), which covers military commanders, while the case at hand deals with
Article 28(b), which covers superiors. Subsection 28(a)(ii) and 28(b)(iii),
however, are identical, which makes the Court's clarification persuasive. Article
28(a)(ii) and (b)(iii) read: "[That] superior [military commander or person] failed
to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent
or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities
for investigation and prosecution."" The Court said:
[Tlhe failure of a superior to fulfil [sic] his duties during and after the crimes
can have a causal impact on the commission of further crimes. As
punishment is an inherent part of prevention of future crimes, a
commander's past failure to punish crimes is likely to increase the risk that
further crimes will be committed in the future.50
The Court continued in the next paragraph:
There is no direct causal link that needs to be established between the
superior's omission and the crime committed by his subordinates.
Therefore, the Chamber considers that it is only necessary to prove that the
commander's omission increased the risk of the commission of the crimes
charged in order to hold him criminally responsible under article 28(a) of
the Statute.5'
Therefore, it is unnecessary to prove that the Pope's policy defacto caused
the continued abuse, only that it "increased the risk of the commission of the
crimes." The Pope, factually, failed to both "take all necessary and reasonable
measures .

.

. to prevent or repress [the] commission" of the acts, evidenced by

47

Ratzinger, Congregationfor the Doctrine ofFaith Letter (cited in note 4) (alteration in original).

48

Id.

49
50

Rome Statute at Arts 28(a)(ii) and 28(b)(iii).
Bemba Confirmation Decision, 424 (cited in note 24) (internal citations omitted).

51

IdT425.
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the fact that abuse continued almost unimpeded, and "to submit the matter to
the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution,"5 2 evidenced by his
adherence to and enforcement of the Crimen Sollicitaioni.53 Under the ICC's
Bemba Confirmation Decision rationale, the Pope's "omission[s] increased the
risk of the commission of the crimes." This is the strongest argument for the
Pope's individual criminal liability, especially in light of the Church's recent
acknowledgments that it made "sins of omission" in handling the abuse."
B. Widespread or Systematic Attack
"[P]art of a widespread or systematic attack" 6 is not further defined in the
Statute. While "attack" historically required an element of armed conflict," today
an attack on a civilian population may occur in peacetime.s
"Widespread and systematic are considered to be alternative
requirements."" The Court has defined widespread as "massive, frequent, large
scale action, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed
against a multiplicity of victims" and systematic as "thoroughly organized and
following a regular pattern on the basis of a common policy involving
substantial public or private resources." 60 This definition is supported by both
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)61 and the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).62 The defining element of
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both "widespread" and "systematic" arises from a nexus between the core crime
and a policy of some government or organization to perpetuate those crimes.63
In March 2009, the ICC issued an Arrest Warrant in the case of The
Prosecutorv Omar HassanAbmadAl Bashir (Al BashirArrest Warrant) for, inter alia,
crimes against humanity. The Court provided the following:
... there are reasonable grounds to believe that the unlawful attack on the
above-mentioned part of the civilian population of Darfur was (i)
widespread, as it affected, at least, hundreds of thousands of individuals and
took place across large swathes of the territory of the Darfur region; and (ii)
systematic, as the acts of violence involved followed, to a considerable
extent, a similar pattern.6
The Court considered the multiplicity of victims and geographic reach of
the attack with respect to "widespread" and the similarity in pattern with respect
to "systematic."
In the case at hand, evidence of abuse is extensive. As recently as 2010,
news sources have commented that "[t]he spread of hundreds of sex-abuse
allegations across Europe . . . has cut into the church's credibility in former
Catholic strongholds."'6 I will briefly outline some of the evidence of abuse in
Ireland and the US.
Beginning in 1999, the Irish Government investigated the extent of the
abuse of children by the Catholic Church operating in Ireland from 1936 to
2009, publishing its results in 2009 (commonly known as The Ryan Report or
The Ryan Commission).6 6 The investigation "found that [abuse was]
systematically covered up and perpetrators who were also permanently professed
members of the Congregation were recklessly allowed continued access to
children in order to protect the Congregation from scandal and those permanent
iso found
on that
htti this
members from criminal prosecution. ,,671teCm
In fact, "the Commission

63

Chesterman, 10 Duke J Comp & Ind L at 317 (cited in note 57).

6

Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest for
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 5 (Mar 9, 2009), online at http://www.icccpi.int/icedocs/doc/doc639078.pdf (visited Apr 8, 2011) ("AlBasbirArrest Warrant').
Meichtry, Pope Convenes Cardinals On Response to Sex Abuse, Wall St J at A12 (cited in note 32)

65

66
67

(internal quotations omitted).
See generally Ryan Report vol 1, ch 1 (cited in note 29) (establishing the Commission).
Groome, 11 Chi J Intl L at 502-03 (cited in note 40); Geoffrey Robertson, Prosecute the Pope, 1
(The Daily Beast, Apr 1, 2010), online at http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/201004-01/take-him-to-court/ (visited Apr 8, 2011) (stating that the finding of the Ryan Report "was
not merely that 'sexual abuse was endemic in boys' institutions,' but that the church hierarchy
protected the perpetrators and, despite knowledge of their propensity to reoffend, allowed them
to take up new positions teaching other vulnerable children after their victims had been solemnly
sworn to secrecy').

Summer 2011

353

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

'policy facilitated further abuse when offenders were transferred within the
Congregation or permitted to leave in good standing." 68
Abuse has also been prevalent in the US.69 A Report from the John Jay
College of Criminal Justice (John Jay Report) surveyed Catholic priests in the
US. 70 The report found 11,000 allegations of sexual abuse, 6,700 (61 percent) of
which were substantiated (3,300 were not investigated due to the priest's
death). While the number of priests that abused children was only 4,450 (4.0
percent), which is relatively small, the fact that the Report was a survey means
that it arguably suffers from a reporting bias (abuse may not have been
reported). Additionally, the Report found that while most accused priests were
accused of a single event of abuse, 1,823 (40.9 percent) had two or more
allegations.7 2 The Report gave five factors that it believed contributed to the
problem: (1) failure by the hierarchy to grasp the seriousness of the problem, (2)
overemphasis on the need to avoid a scandal, (3) use of unqualified treatment
centers, (4) misguided willingness to forgive, and (5) insufficient accountability. 73
Allegations of abuse have also been made in Africa (Kenya),74 Asia
(Philippines),7 5 Europe (Austria," Belgium,
France,' Germany, Italy,so
68
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One could persuasively argue that the Church's conduct constituted
"massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with considerable
seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims."92 The large
geographical and temporal reach of the abuse weighs in favor of this conclusion.
However, the relatively small percentage of priests who were inflicting the abuse
(for example, 4.0 percent in the US according to the John Jay Report) swings the
pendulum back. In light of the body of allegations, the multiplicity of victims,
and the consistency with which the attacks occurred globally, it seems likely that
the sexual abuse was "widespread." This argument runs parallel to the Court's
rationale in the Al Bashir Arrest Warrant, quoted above, which makes it
particularly persuasive.
A less persuasive argument could be made that the conduct was
"systematic" or "thoroughly organized and following a regular pattern on the
basis of a common policy involving substantial public or private resources." The
policy of covering up the abuse and allowing the abusers to reoffend by placing
them with more children lends itself to the "systematic" nature of the attack,
although this is a slightly more attenuated argument given that there certainly
was no underlying policy requiring or directing the priests to sexually abuse
children. The cover-up was certainly "thoroughly organized and followed a
regular pattern on the basis of a common policy," but the abuse itself was not. It
seems unlikely that the cover-up, which is not one of the enumerated acts,
would qualify now under the "systematic" requirement. Further, the extent to
which the attacks "involv[ed] substantial public or private resources" is
questionable. An argument could be made, however, that the use of Church
locations, time (insofar as the priests were employees or agents of the church),
and influence satisfy this requirement.
Ultimately, the satisfaction of both widespread and systematic is not
necessary-a successful prosecution would only need to prove one. The obstacle
for a prosecutor will be proving that the relatively small percentage of priests
offending amounts to a widespread attack, as "widespread" is the most viable
avenue for prosecution.
C. Directed Against a Civilian Population
The ICC has explained the "directed against any civilian population"
language, stating that:
the underlying offences defined in article 7(1) of the Statute[(rape)] must be
directed against "any civilian population" to constitute crimes against
humanity . . . this requirement means that the civilian population must be

the primary object of the attack and not just an incidental victim of the attack.
92
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... [Tihe Chamber is of the view that the Prosecutor must demonstrate that
the attack was such that it cannot be characterised as having been directed
against only a limited and randomly selected group of individuals.93
"[D]irected against any civilian population" is further defined in Article
7( 2 )(a) as "a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts ...
against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or
organizational policy to commit such attack." 94 The ICC has confirmed that
"article [7(2)(a)] specifies that the two cumulative elements, i.e. the multiple
commission of acts and the attack being pursuant to or in furtherance of a State
or organizational policy to commit such attack, should also be present."95
There are four distinct questions, each of which will be answered in turn:
(1) whether the children constitute a civilian population, (2) whether the
Church's actions were directed against that civilian population, (3) whether there
existed a "multiple commission of acts" and (4) whether the attack was made "in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy."
1. Civilian population.
There is a strong argument for the successful classification of the children
as a civilian population:
The findings of the Ryan Commission establish that over the course of sixty
years, thousands of children were placed in Christian Brothers' institutions
and became victims of widespread physical and sexual abuse.

. .

. [T]he

sheer number of children and the broad time period of the crimes suggest at
least the potential that children committed by courts to the care of religious
congregations constitute a civilian population that meets the threshold
established by international law.96
As a footnote to the quotation above, author Dermot Groome writes,
The Ryan Commission examined institutions operated by seven other
religious congregations . . . . Ryan Report, vol 2 §1-16[.] Each of these
congregations was under the direct supervision of the Vatican. While it is
beyond the scope of this paper, if there is evidence establishing
coordination and cooperation in the violence propagated in these other
institutions they may be considered part of the same attack for the purposes
of this element.97
The evidence of coordination is the Pope's global policy, which enabled
abuse to continue against the children, as evidenced by the Crimen Sollicitationis
and the 2001 letter. Groome's scholarship considers sexual and non-sexual abuse
93
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of children. Although the non-sexual physical abuse is beyond the scope of this
Comment, the global coordination of sexual abuse policy will likely be enoughit will allow the various attacks to be considered part of the same attack against a
civilian population.
2. Directed against.
With respect to whether the Church's actions were directed against the
civilian population, recall that the ICC requires the "civilian population be the
primary object of the attack, and not just an incidental victim."" The ICC has also
stated that it is "the underlying offences defined in article 7(1) of the Statute[,
and not the Article 28 superior conduct, that] must be directed against 'any
civilian population' to constitute crimes against humanity."99 The prosecutor,
then, would have to argue that the policy disseminated by the Church to the
abusers enabled the abusers to carry out attacks without fear of outside
interference or punishment-thereby allowing the abuse itself, and not just the
cover-up, to be directed against the children.
The Church's argument would likely be that the victims were simply
incidental and that there was no intent to isolate the victims as a class. The
problem is that not only is the class of victims exclusive (children), but the
Church's documents discuss children specifically and aim to avoid scandal at the
expense of the children (or more accurately, at the expense of the children's
ability to seek outside help).'"2 This means that abusers were directed by the
policy to cover-up abuse, which created an environment enabling further abuse
against children. In this way it could be argued that the children were the
primary object of the attack.
While this argument stretches the traditional conception of "directed
against" (insofar as there was no cooperative effort to abuse children, but merely
an effort to cover it up at the expense of enabling more), there is an argument
for accepting it. 101 The initial sexual abuse of children was not an attack directedat
them. But after the Vatican (lead by Cardinal Ratzinger) became aware of the
98
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101
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76 (cited in note 24).

While the widespread sexual abuse described in the Ryan Report is dearly a
purposeful practice of covering up criminal acts to protect religious
congregations and their permanent members, it is not so clearly a purposeful
attack directed at children. That such egregious conduct could have such grave
consequences for a civilian population raises the question of whether an attack
against a civilian population that is the result of negligent or reckless conduct
could satisfy the contextual requirements of a crime against humanity.
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conduct and the grave effect that the policy would have on children, and
nevertheless enacted and followed it, the Vatican could be said to have
purposefully directed an attack against the children.102 When abusers then
received the policies and followed them, they too participated in the direct
attack. This argument turns on whether the Court is willing to allow the
Church's conscious disregard of risk to trickle down to the actual abusers, which
is likely given that all priests knew about the policies. As discussed above, the
Article 30 definitions of intent, which allow a conscious disregard of mental
state, also lend support to this conclusion.10 3
In order to satisfy the "direct against" language of the Statute a prosecutor
will need to show that (a) the children were the primary object of the attack and
(b) that the conduct of the actual abusers was directed at the children.
3. Multiple commissions of acts.
The ICC has further articulated the showing required to satisfy (3), whether
there existed a "multiple commission of acts." The Court stated that "[t]he legal
requisite of 'multiple commission of acts' means that more than a few isolated
incidents or acts as referred to in article 7(1) of the Statute have occurred.""
This element requires a showing similar to the one required for "widespread or
systematic." "More than a few isolated incidents or acts" is, however, a very low
bar and will almost certainly be met by the evidence set forth in Section II.B.
4. State or organizational policy.
With respect to (4), whether the actions occurred as a part of a "state or
organizational policy," the ICC has stated that:
Such a policy may be made by groups of persons who govern a specific
territory or by any organization with the capability to commit a widespread
or systematic attack against a civilian population. The policy need not be
formalised. Indeed, an attack which is planned, directed or organized-as
opposed to spontaneous or isolated acts of violence-will satisfy this
criterion. 05
The Akayesu case, before the ICTY, provides further articulation, stating
that "[t]here is no requirement that this policy must be adopted formally as the
policy of a state. There must however be some kind of preconceived plan or
policy."' 6 The two questions here are (a) whether the "state or organizational
policy" applies to non-state actors, like the Catholic Church, and (b) whether the
102
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conduct of the Church was "planned, directed or organized" and made pursuant
to, or constitutes, a "preconceived plan or policy."
a) Non-state actors. With respect to (a), the operative language in Article
7(2)(a) is "state or organizational policy," which on its face would seem to
include an organization like the Catholic Church. Indeed, the ICC follows this
same interpretation. In its Decision on the Confirmation of Charges in the
Prosecutorv Katanga case (KatangaConfirmation Decision), the Court stated:
Such a policy may be either by groups of persons who govern a specific
territory or by any organisation with the capability to commit a widespread
or systematic attack against a civilian population. The policy need not be
explicitly defined by the organisational group. 07
The Court followed this approach after the Katanga Confirmation Decision, for
example, in the Bemba Confirmation Decision.0 8
Interestingly, however, the chair of the ICC drafting committee has stated
that:
Article 7 does not bring a new development to crimes against humanity,
namely, its applicability to non-state actors. . . . The text clearly refers to
state policy, and the words "organizational policy" . . . do not refer to the

policy of an organization, but the policy of a state. 09
Despite the chair's comment that a facial interpretation would "bring a new
development to crimes against humanity,"no his position is contrary to
customary international law, which has no such requirement, evidenced by
numerous ICTY cases."' Although the chair's statement casts some doubt over
whether an organization can satisfy Article 7, the ICC's acceptance of non-state
organizations in its cases is persuasive.112 Further, the Catholic Church is a multinational religious organization spanning the globe, and it would be difficult to
question its "capability to commit a widespread or systematic attack.""'
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b)'Preconceivedplan or policy" and 'jIanned, directed, or organiZed." Under the
ICTY language of "preconceived plan or policy," the Church's formal policy
outlined in the Crimen Sollidtationis and Ratzinger's letter will likely satisfy this
requirement.114 Groome summarizes the conclusion of the Ryan Report:
The Commission found that the predominant consideration in dealing with
sexual abuse was to protect the institution from the perceived harm that
would result if the allegations became public . . . [and] that this "policy

facilitated further abuse when offenders were transferred within the
Congregation or permitted to leave in good standing."' 5
Certainly the Church's formalized and implemented policy satisfies the
"preconceived plan or policy" language.
The sufficiency of the Church's policy is less clear when considered in light
of the ICC's comment in the Bemba Confirmation Decision: "Indeed, an attack
which is planned, directed or organized-as opposed to spontaneous or isolated
acts of violence-will satisfy this criterion.""' In our case, the attacks followed a
regular pattern (abuse, cover-up, no accountability) and were certainly more than
spontaneous or isolated. Section II.C.2 (discussing whether the attack was
"directed against" the children) outlined a theory in which the superiors'
conscious disregard of the Policy's risks constituted a direct attack against the
children. This theory also suggests that a conscious disregard mental state could
trickle down to the individual abusers who were made aware of the policy and
then abused children. Applying that same theory here would mean that the
Policy was not only planned and organized, but directed against the children.
Satisfying the various elements of "[d]irected against any civilian
population" will be the other evidentiary obstacle, next to proving that the attack
was "widespread"-both of which will be the lynchpins of proving crimes
against humanity. Still, like the "widespread" requirement, there seems to be
enough evidence to support colorable arguments.
5. With knowledge of the attack.
In the Bemba Confirmation Decision, the ICC stated:
88. The perpetrator must be aware that a widespread attack directed against
a civilian population is taking place and that his action is part of the attack.
However, . . . the element "with knowledge" "should not be interpreted as
requiring proof that the perpetrator had knowledge of all characteristics of

114
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the attack or the precise details of the plan or policy of the State or
organization."' 17
The question is whether the Article 28 superior (the Pope) or the Article
7(1) abusers are the ones who must have acted "with knowledge of the attack."
In that same opinion, concerning Article 28 liability, the ICC continued by
stating that:
89. The Chamber notes that the mode of responsibility concerning [the
superior] is dealt with separately ... at this point, the Chamber confines its
examination to the contextual element of crimes against humanity "with
knowledge of the attack" which pertains to the knowledge of the attack by
the alleged direct perpetrators." 8
This means that we must analyze the knowledge of the actual abusers for
purposes of this section. The Pope's individual culpability has been dealt with in
Section II.A.
The Church itself has acknowledged that it made "sins of omission in
handling sexual-abuse cases.""' The abusers were made aware that "a
circumstance exist[ed]" when they either read directly or were directed to adhere
to the Church's policy set forth in the 2001 letter and Crimen Sollicitationis.
Further, after receiving that information, and complying, they would arguably
have been aware of the widespread nature of the abuse and of their part in the
attack. Further, the ICC's clarification that "knowledge" "should not be
interpreted as requiring proof that the perpetrator had knowledge of all
characteristics of the attack or the precise details of the plan or policy of the
State or organization" makes this argument more persuasive.12 0
D. Conclusion on Culpability
The preceding analysis suggests that a prosecution of the Pope is plausible.
Sexual abuse is one of the enumerated "acts" under the Statute. Article 28's
respondeat superior individual criminal liability covers the Pope's position in the
CDF and his actions. The large temporal and global span of abuse suggests that
the incidents were "widespread." While the abuse is less likely to qualify as
"systematic," a prosecutor need only satisfy widespread or systematic, not both.
The victims, the children, will very likely qualify as a civilian population. The
Church's conscious disregard for the safety of the children, and their policies of
hiding the allegations, arguably amount to an attack "directed against a civilian
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88.
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Id

89.
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Meichtry, Pope Convenes Cardinals On Response to Sex Abuse, Wall St
(internal quotations omitted).
Bemba Confirmation Decision, 1 88 (cited in note 24).
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population" that can trickle down to the individual abusers. Finally, the abusers'
knowledge of the attack and their participation in enabling further abuse will
likely satisfy the knowledge requirement.
Moreover, a potential prosecutor would almost certainly reference the
Preamble to the ICC Statute, in which the state parties acknowledge that they are
"mindful that during this century millions of children, women, and men have
been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of
humanity," and the State parties "affirmfl that the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole must not go
unpunished[.]"1 2' The purposes of the ICC run parallel to the type of abuse
involved in the Church scandal, which lends weight to a potential prosecutor's
argument. Although there are some obstacles in terms of legal definitions and
evidentiary showings, a potential prosecutor has colorable arguments for
culpability.
III. DEFENSES
The question now turns to whether the Pope has any viable defenses. The
primary, and likely only, substantive defense will be that the Pope is due head of
state immunity.
Head of state immunity is an immunity that applies to the actions of a head
of state or high ranking government official under the rationale that "[those]
official acts of a head of state [should be] treated as those of the state," which
are immune from foreign adjudication.'2 2 Although one could argue that the
Vatican is not a state, a discussion would be onerous, and likely inconclusive for
the purposes of determining whether it satisfies the customary definition of the
immunity. 123 Moreover, the focus of the debate will likely be whether or not the
immunity is recognized (or applicable) in the ICC. As such, I will assume that
the Vatican is a State and that the immunity would apply to the Pope under
customary international law.
The ICC Statute very clearly does not recognize head of state immunity.
Article 27, titled "Irrelevance of official capacity," states:
121
122
123

Rome Statute at Preamble.
Aust, Handbook ofIntemaionalLaw at 177 (cited in note 11).
Id (internal citations omitted):
As a result of the Lateran Treaty 1929 between the Holy See and Italy, and
recognition and acquiescence by states, the Vatican City (albeit tiny in area and
with resident population of papal functionaries) would seem to be a state even
though its sole purpose is to support the religious and moral purposes of the
Holy See. It has permanent observer status in the United Nations, is a full
member of some other international organizations, and is a party to
multilateral treaties.
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(1) This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction
based on official capacity. In particular, official capadly as a Head of State or
Government orparliament, an elected representative or a government offidal shall in no
case exempt a person from criminal responsibilit under this Statute, nor shall it, in

and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. (2) Immunities
or specific procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a
person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court
from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.124
Accordingly, the immunity is not only prohibited, but, importantly, subsection
(2) precludes any customary international law from preempting that prohibition.
The ICC itself has adhered to this prohibition by continuing proceedings
against multiple individuals in high-ranking military and head of state
positions.125 In the pending prosecution of Sudanese President Al Bashir, the
ICC has twice (in 2009 and 2010) continued the prosecution of, and indeed
issued arrest warrants for, the current head of state.126 In fact, the ICC has just
recently opened an investigation into the conduct of Muammar Al Gaddafi in
Libya.12 7 The current position of the ICC shows that it is willing to prosecute

heads of state.128
Nonetheless, several commentators argue that the ICC's position is wrong.
Some commentary argues that regardless of the ICC Statute, the Court should
recognize the immunity to keep the Statute from conflicting with international
customary law.129
Arguing along similar lines, the Pope could claim that head of state
immunity is de facto absolute in all international criminal proceedings.' 30 Dapo
Akande makes this argument, citing the International Court of Justice's (ICJ)

124
125

126

Rome Statute at Art 27 (emphasis added).
See, for example, Case of the Prosecutorv Omar HassanAhmadAl Bashir, online at http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/situations%/o20and%/o20cases/situations/situation%20icc%/o200205/related%/o20c
ases/icc02050109/iccO2050109?lan=en-GB (visited Apr 8, 2011); Bemba Confirmation Decision
(cited in note 24).

128

Id.
Statement of the Prosecutoron the opening of an investigation into the situation in Libya (cited in note 15).
Robertson, Prosecute the Pope (cited in note 67). See also Victor Peskin, The Omar al-BashirIndictment:
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the ICC and the Darfur crisis (Open Democracy, July 15, 2008),
online at
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/the-omar-al-bashir-indictment-the-icc-and-the-darfurcrisis (visited Apr 8, 2011).
See generally Dapo Akande, InternationalLaw Immuniies and the InternationalCriminalCourt, 98 Am J
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Intl L 407 (2004).
Dapo Akande, Can the Pope Be Arested in Connection with the Sexual Abuse Scandal? (Blog of the
European Journal of International Law, Apr 14, 2010), online at http://www.ejiltalk.org/can-thepope-be-arrested-in-connection-with-the-sexual-abuse-scandal/ (visited Apr 8, 2011).
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Arrest Warrant Case in support. 131 The ICJ is, similar to the ICC, an international
court created by the UN, but it is an entirely distinct entity. 2 The ICJ does not
have jurisdiction over individuals, corporations, or organizations, but exclusively
countries, which must consent to the Court's jurisdiction 31 (compared to the
ICC, which hears exclusively individual criminal disputes).'- In the Arrest
WarrantCase, the ICJ held that:
the issue of a warrant for the arrest of a foreign minister for war crimes and
crimes against humanity .

.

. [was a] coercive measure[] that violated his

inviolability and absolute immunity from criminal jurisdiction under
customary international law for all acts, public or private, committed while
in office or before.135
After The Arrest Warrant Case, and under its articulation of customary
international law on head of state immunity, the Pope, either in his present
capacity or his previous capacity as the leader of the CDF, qualifies for head of
state immunity.' 6 Further, because the Pope's promulgation and enforcement of
the policy was done in his "public capacity" and not as a "private act," he would
be immune from prosecution relating to it even after he has left office (which is
mostly irrelevant given the Popes' historical tendency to leave office exclusively
through death).13 7

''

Id, citing Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), 2002 ICJ 4,
http://www.icjat
online
cij.org/docket/index.php?pl=3&p2=3&k=36&case=121&code=cobe&p3=4
(visited Apr 8,
2011) ("The Arrest Warrant Case"):

132

These immunities are absolute in the case of criminal proceedings. In other
words there are no exceptions to the immunity. The International Court of
justice's decision in the Arrest Warrant Case (Congo v Belgium) 2002
confirms that this type of immunity continues to apply even when it is alleged
that the head of State has committed international crimes. So an allegation that
the Pope may be responsible for crimes against humanity will not suffice to
defeat his immunity.
Aust, Handbook ofInternadonalLaw at 448 (cited in note 11).

13

Id at 451.

134

Rome Statute at Art 1.

135

Aust, Handbook of InternationalLaw at 177 (cited in note 11), citing The Arrest Warrant Case, 2002
ICJ 4 (cited in note 131).
Aust, Handbook of InternationalLaw at 177-78 ("This decision necessarily applies also to heads of
state and heads of government, and may apply to other senior officials such as defense
ministers."), citing Colin Warbrick, ed, Current Developments: Pubc International Law, 53 Intl &
Comp L Q 769, 771-74 (2004).
Aust, Handbook of InternationalLaw at 178 ("But, once such a person has left office, can he be
arrested and prosecuted for a crime committed while in of6ce? He would have continuing
immunity for private crimes, but the Arrest Warrant judgment suggests that he would have
continuing immunity for crimes committed in his pubc capacity.") (emphasis in original, internal
citations omitted).
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The problem with this argument is that The Arrest Warrant Case judgment
was before the ICJ, not the ICC. The ICJ has no clause prohibiting the use of
head of state immunity and its sources of law differ from the ICC's. The ICJ
Statute Article 38 lists, in no hierarchical order, "(a) [i]nternational conventions .
(b) [i]nternational custom . . . (c) [t]he general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations." 3 8 Subsections (b) and (c) include the customary international
principle of head of state immunity. So in the Arrest Warrant Case, head of state
immunity was not only not prohibited, but it was a legitimate source of law for
the court. This means that it was not, as Akende says, absolute (that is, it did not
preempt a contrary statutory prohibition) but rather, it came from the Statute's
sources of law, unimpeded.
In the ICC, on the other hand, the Statute states that "[t]he Court shall
apply: (a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of
Procedure and Evidence; (2) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable
treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the
established principles of the international law of armed conflict." 139 The
language "in the first place" and "in the second place" indicates that the ICC
Statute preempts "principles and rules of international law." Additionally, the
language "where appropriate" suggests that those instances when customary
international law applies is limited. And contravening a clear prohibition on head
of state immunity would not qualify as a "where appropriate" circumstance. The
defense of head of state immunity will almost certainly fail.
As a note, Article 98 of the Statute prohibits the court from proceeding
with a request for surrender that would require the requested state to act
contrary to international obligations or agreements it has with a third party
state.'40 This means that, should the court request that a state surrender the
Pope, that requested state is not required to violate an international law or
obligation it has with the Vatican in arresting and surrendering the Pope. While
this presents a potential barrier to invoking jurisdiction, it (a) has no bearing on
whether the ICC recognizes the immunity as a defense in trial and (b) has
recently been called into question by ICC cases and state party action.14 1 This

138

League of Nations, Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (Dec 16, 1920), Art
38(1), 1155 UNTS 331.

139

Rome Statute at Art 21 (1)(a)-(b).

'
141

Id at Art 98.
Compare Rome Statute at Art 98 with Akande, Can the Pope Be Arrested in Connection with the Sexual
Abuse Scandal? (cited in note 130). Akande's article focuses on the practicalities of physically
obtaining the Pope, and while those considerations are important to obtaining jurisdiction over
the Pope, it does not follow that they provide a defense for the Pope once jurisdiction is obtained.
A thorough analysis is provided in Section IV.C.4.
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issue will be dealt with in more detail in Section IV.C.4. Article 98 is only one of
the several jurisdictional obstacles that may stand in the way of a prosecution.
IV. JURISDICTION
Obtaining jurisdiction over both the Pope and the conduct giving rise to a
claim presents some serious challenges for a prosecutor. Although they are not
"defenses" in the sense that they would be brought up in trial, jurisdictional
issues would likely be hotly contested issues in pre-trial proceedings. The first
question is whether the Statute's double jeopardy provision will be triggered by
previous and future cases (because the Pope has not yet been charged) in which
the Pope has been named as a defendant. The second is whether the Pope's
conduct comes within the temporal jurisdiction of the ICC. And the final is
whether, and by what method, the case could be referred to the ICC (a corollary
of which is how the Pope himself could be arrested and surrendered). Each will
be addressed in turn.
A. Double Jeopardy Preemption
The complementary principle (or, as it is commonly referred to, double
jeopardy preemption) prohibits an individual from standing trial for crimes that
have already been adjudicated, usually as a matter of comity. Article 17(l)(b) of
the ICC Statute states:
the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: . . . (b) The case

has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and that State
has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision
resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to
prosecute. 142
Article 20(3) states:
No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed

under article 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same
conduct unless the proceedings in the other court: (a) Were for the purpose
of shielding the person from criminal responsibility for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court; or (b) Otherwise were not conducted
independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of due process

recognized by international law and were conducted in a manner which, in
the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice.143

So, the first question is: has the Pope already been tried?

142

Rome Statute at Art 17(l)(b).

143

Id at Art 20(3).
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In a 2005 Texas case, Doe v Roman Catholic Diocese of Galveston-Houston, the
plaintiff named the Pope as a defendant, and the court granted a motion to
dismiss based on head of state immunity.'" Although the Pope was not tried for
"crimes against humanity" (which does not exist under US law), he could argue
that the impetus for both charges is the same conduct. Indeed, the plaintiffs in
that case relied upon exactly the same evidence that an ICC prosecutor would
rely upon (the 2001 letter and the Crimen Sollidtationis).145 The problem for the
Pope is that the decision in Texas was not made upon the court's legal
determination that the Pope was due immunity. Rather, the court held that "[i]n
this case, the United States, through its Suggestion of Immunity and letter from
the Department of State Legal Advisor, has explicitly requested that [the Pope]
be dismissed from this lawsuit on the basis of head of state immunity."'" The
decision was, therefore, not based upon any substantive legal basis, but, as the
court stated:
[o~nce the State Department has determined that immunity is warranted,
and has submitted that ruling to the court through a suggestion, the matter is
for diplomatic rather thanjudicial resolution..

.

. The executive's determination is

not subject to additional review by a federal court..

.

. After a suggestion of

47
immunity is filed, it is the "court's duty" to surrenderjurisdiction.1

This means that the state (in this case, the US) was unwilling to genuinely
prosecute-a trigger for the exception in Article 17(l)(b). Additionally, the
proceedings could easily be said to have been "conducted in a manner which, in
the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned
to justice." 14 Having triggered exceptions to the complementary principle
embodied in the Statute, it is unlikely that the Roman CatholicDiocese proceedings
will preclude an ICC prosecution. While suits may have been and may continue
to be filed naming the Pope as a defendant, any in which the Pope is granted
head of state immunity will likely fail to estop an ICC prosecution for the
reasons Roman Catholic Diocese does not-because the ICC does not recognize
the immunity, and because its application evidences an unwillingness to bring
the Pope to justice.

14

145

Doe v Roman Cathokc Diocese of Galveston-Houston, 408 F Supp 2d 272 (SD Tex 2005). See also Pope
seeks immunity over sex abuse suit, Associated Press (Aug 17, 2005), online at
http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/pope-seeks-immunity-over-sex-abusesuit/2005/08/17/1123958097061.html (visited Apr 8, 2011).
Roman CathocDiocese of Galveston-Houston,408 F Supp 2d at 276.

147

Id at 279.
Id at 278 (internal citations omitted) (emphases added).

148

Rome Statute at Art 20(3).
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B. Non-retroactivity Ratione Personae
The ICC entered into force on July 1, 2002.149 The ICC Statute does not
hear disputes over crimes committed before its entry into force. Article 11(1)
states that "[t]he Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed
after the entry into force of this Statute."so Article 24(1) states that "[n]o person
shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct prior to the entry
into force of the Statute.".. The particular conduct surrounding a potential
claim is the enactment, by then Cardinal Ratzinger, of the enhanced Crimen
Sollicitationis and its subsequent implementation. The first clear event, which
manifests the primary piece of evidence, was the original letter Cardinal
Ratzinger sent to the bishops in 2001. This conduct is outside the jurisdictional
scope of the ICC. However, the 2001 letter merely established the policy. The
Pope continued to follow and enforce the policy after July 1, 2002.152 The same
crime Cardinal Ratzinger was guilty of in 2001 he was guilty of from 2002
forward. The letter was simply the first, official articulation of the Vatican's
policy.
In fact, the plaintiffs in Roman Catholic Diocese argued that "[the 2001]
document demonstrates an ongoing conspiracy, fraud, fraudulent concealment,
misrepresentation, and conspiracy to commit and conceal the fact that members
of the clergy sexual abused minors by the Catholic hierarchy[.]""s3 The plaintiffs
further alleged that a "[2002] letter combined with the Crimen Sollicitationis and
other proclamations by Pope Benedict, further demonstrates the ongoing
conspiracy that both victimized plaintiffs and prevented them from filing this
lawsuit earlier."' 54 After the scandal broke in early 2002, the Vatican did not take
any decisive steps to stop or prevent abuse, but relied upon Ratzinger's
policies.'"' Furthermore, "[a] national survey of Catholics released in November
2002 asked whether the scandal was 'about acts which occurred a long time ago,
149

150

When did the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court enter into force? (International Criminal
Court)
online
at
http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/about%20the%20court/frequently%/2asked%/ 20questions/when%2Odid/20t
he%20rome%20statute%200fl/o20the%20international%20criminal%20court/o20enter%/o20into%
20force (visited Apr 8, 2011).
Rome Statute at Art 11(1).

152

Id at Art 24(1).
Allen, 1962 document orders seeny in sex cases (cited in note 5) (describing the continuing nature of
the abuse); Barnett, Vatican told bishops to cover up sex abuse (cited in note 6).
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Roman Cathokc Diocese of Galveston-Houston,408 F Supp 2d at 276.

154

Id.

1s

Peter Steinfels, A People Adrift: the Crisis of the Roman Cathokc Church in America 63 (Simon &
Schuster 2003).
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or are these acts still occurring today?' Over two-thirds answered 'still occurring
today.""" Even as recently as November 2010 the Church has acknowledged
the continued nature of abuse and its "sins of omission.""' These continued
instances of adherence to the policy amount to culpable conduct occurring after
July 1st, 2002. Likely, this conduct will satisfy the ICC's temporal jurisdiction
requirements.
C. Invoking Jurisdiction
Article 13 provides three ways for jurisdiction to be invoked: (1) by state
party referral; (2) by UN Security Council referral; or (3) by the prosecutor
initiating an investigation on its own."' Indeed, the ICC has invoked jurisdiction
by each of these methods."' I shall address each in turn.
1. State reference.
The first method, under Article 13(a), allows for jurisdiction if a state party
refers an alleged crime to the prosecutor.o6 0 Pursuant to Article 12, for a party to
be eligible to refer a case, the conduct must have occurred in the territory of that
State, and that State must be party to the ICC.16 ' In cases of superior liability,
like the Pope's, there are two classes of conduct: the abuse, and the cover-up by
the superior. The Article 7(1) conduct is almost certainly the relevant conduct,
and the list of qualified states is long. Any state party where abuse occurred will
be eligible-namely, Ireland (as the US is not a party to the ICC). If the relevant
conduct is the cover-up, or the enactment of the policy embodying the cover-up,
and if that conduct cannot be said to have occurred globally (which, given the
fact that it was disseminated and enforced globally, it likely can), the CDF is
located in the Vatican, which is not a party to the ICC.
2. Security Council reference.
The second way to invoke jurisdiction, found in Article 13(b), is by a
reference from the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN

156
15
158
1
160

161

Id at 53.
Meichtry, Pope Convenes Cardinals On Response to Sex Abuse, Wall St
(internal quotations omitted).
Rome Statute at Art 13(a)-(c).

J at A12 (cited in note 32)

Situationsand Cases (cited in note 15).
Rome Statute, Art 13(a) ("A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with article 14.").
Id at Art 12(2).
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Charter.'6 2 This, however, is highly unlikely. The US is on the Security Council
and has strongly opposed the ICC (indeed, it is not a party). The US would
probably veto any proposed reference in this case.'6 3 This is particularly likely
given the US's refusal to prosecute the Pope domestically in Roman Catholic
Diocese, discussed in Section IV.A.
3. Propriomotu.
The third way to obtain jurisdiction, which can be found in Article 13(c), is
for the prosecutor to initiate an investigation on its own (proprio motu). Here,
subject to the same Article 12 requirement that the conduct occur on the
territory of a state party, the prosecutor could initiate an investigation. This is the
most likely and easiest avenue for invoking jurisdiction, as it requires no state
party action.
4. Article 98.
As mentioned in Section III on head of state immunity, Article 98
prohibits the court from issuing a request for surrender:
which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its
obligations under international law [or international agreements] with
respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a
third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third
State for the waiver of immunity. 1
This is important because the ICC has no enforcement mechanism and must
rely on arrest and surrender at the national level, which Article 98 seems to
regulate.16 s If a state recognizes the immunity, or is under an obligation to
recognize such an immunity pursuant to an international agreement, the consent
of the Vatican would be necessary to the Pope's arrest and surrender. The
Vatican will certainly refuse to cooperate with any proceeding against the Pope,
and, therefore, the requested State would have to be one that does not recognize
the immunity and is under no obligation to do so. Overcoming Article 98 (that
is, finding a State that is not prohibited from surrendering the Pope) is a major
obstacle in physically obtaining him-a necessary element to his prosecution.'
162

Id at Art 13(b) ("A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been
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committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations.").
Aust, Handbook of InternadonalLaw at 280-81 (cited in note 11). However, the Security Council's
recent referral of the situation in Libya suggests that the US is not opposed to the ICC in all cases.
See Situations and Cases (cited in note 15).
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Rome Statute at Art 98.
Dapo Akande, The Legal Nature of Securiy Coundl Rferrals to the ICC and its Impact on Al Bashir's
Immunities, 7 J Ind Crim Justice 333, 337 (2009).
Rome Statute at Art 63(1) ("The accused shall be present during the trial.").
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The Court has not directly addressed the tension between Article 98 and
Article 27's prohibition on head of state immunity. The question is whether
Article 27's prohibition applies only during trial or at the national level (which
would mean that state parties could ignore head of state immunity, effectively
rendering Article 98 meaningless). Although the latter is a strange argument to
accept, the practice of the parties to the ICC seems to suggest that this is so. "A
number of states have adopted domestic implementing legislation which
implicitly or explicitly take[s] the view that officials of other states may not be
entitled to international law immunity from arrest when a request for arrest has
been made by the ICC."' This means that at least some state parties believe
they are obligated under Article 27 to ignore head of state immunity and would
consent to surrendering a head of state despite Article 98. There is an alternate
theory as well, suggesting that Article 98 only applies to non-party states (which
would include the Vatican and the Pope).1" The actions of the Court (in not
precluding the issue of arrest warrants for Al Bashir despite Article 98) and the
actions of state parties indicate that Article 98 may not preclude the arrest and
surrender of the Pope by states that might otherwise recognize or have an
obligation to recognize head of state immunity. Until the Court directly
addresses the tension between Articles 27 and 98, it will be unclear how Article
98 would affect the potential arrest and surrender of the Pope.
V. OUTCOMES
Article 77 sets forth the applicable penalties, which include prison
sentences, fines, and the forfeiture of property.170 A more realistic and ideal
penalty would be the creation of a trust fund under Article 79 "for the benefit of
victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and of the families of such
victims . . . [using] money and other property collected through fines or
forfeiture."' 7 ' Indeed this was one of the reasons UN Judge Robertson originally
proposed prosecuting the Pope before the ICC-to get more money for
victimS.172 Obtaining a constructive outcome will likely be the most persuasive
argument for initiating a prosecution (or invoking jurisdiction). States will
certainly be hesitant to pursue a penalty against the Pope involving punitive
J Intl Crim Justice
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Akande, 7
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Id.
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Id at 339. See generally, Akande, 98 Am J Intl L 407 (cited in note 129).
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Rome Statute at Art 77.
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Id at Arts 77, 79(1)-(2).
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Susan Yoshihara, PhD, UN Judge Says Pope Should be Prosecutedat InternationalCnminal Court, 13
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damages, especially given the contentious nature of prosecuting the Pope in the
first place. Creating a fund for the benefit of the victims will encourage more
abuse to come to light and will allow the Church to take an affirmative step in
redressing its omissions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Church abuse scandal prompted cries for justice. The lack of
accountability within the Church and its failure to take any meaningful action
frustrated Christians, victims, and the general public. This analysis suggests that
a prosecution of the Pope before the ICC for crimes against humanity is viable.
Some important questions need to be answered, particularly with respect to legal
definitions and tensions between various articles, which have not yet been
further defined by precedent. The very young age of the ICC and the few
proceedings that have taken place provide a vague-at-best baseline for
interpreting some of that language. Still, after analyzing the current cases before
the Court and the evidence available, it is clear that there exists at least room for
a prosecutor to argue for the Pope's culpability. Whether or not a state party or
the prosecutor will make the political move to refer this case is a much more
difficult question to answer.
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